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Abstract 
 
The gradual entries of ride-hailing platforms 
across China provide us with a unique opportunity to 
examine the interplay among network effects, 
consumer expectations and platform competition in the 
sharing economy. While recent empirical evidence 
shows that the initial entry of Didi Chuxing (the 
leading ride-hailing platform in China) positively 
impacts new car sales in the short run, our study 
demonstrates that, once the time window of 
investigation is expanded from one year to three years, 
the impacts of entries on new car sales turn negative.  
In addition, our analysis provides evidence suggesting 
that intensified competition resulting from platform 
rivalries can boost new car sales to alleviate the 
negative impacts in the short run. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Economists have long been intrigued by network 
externalities and the resultant bandwagon effect 
commonly observed in markets where incompatible 
technologies/standards battle for dominance [27,48].  
Network externalities (sometimes referred to as 
network effects) are associated with many Internet-
based technologies.  Consequently, many studies in the 
IS literature have focused on understanding their 
strategic implications for technology competition and 
IT adoption in the digital economy (e.g., [50,51,59]).  
Internet-enabled sharing platforms such as those of 
Uber and Airbnb operate in two-sided markets where 
there are both same-side and cross-side network 
effects.  Given the prominent role played by those 
platforms in the sharing economy [5,13,18,73,77], it is 
imperative to understand the implications of network 
effects for platform competition and market dynamics. 
Using a dataset of new vehicle registrations from 
many Chinese cities, Guo et al. [36] investigate how 
the entries of Didi Chuxing (the dominant ride-hailing 
platform provider in China
1
) impact new car sales. 
Their empirical analysis shows that, within a one-year 
period, the entry of Didi Chuxing can meaningfully 
increase new car sales. This result is somewhat 
unexpected because conventional wisdom suggests 
that, as using ride-hailing apps becomes more 
affordable and convenient, most people will have 
weaker incentives to purchase a new car. Indeed, many 
Uber users have postponed their new car purchases 
because of the prevalence of ride-hailing services [24].  
Moreover, facing increasingly intense competition 
from the ride-hailing platforms, many taxi companies 
have a strong disincentive to expand their fleets.  Guo 
et al. [36] justify their empirical results by pointing out 
that, as many potential drivers in China need to acquire 
new cars to register for Didi Chuxing, the entries of 
this popular ride-hailing platform can quickly boost 
new car sales.  Because of strong network externalities 
associated with this dominant platform and targeted 
auto dealer promotions (e.g., [60]), the overall impacts 
of Didi’s entries on new car sales are likely to be 
positive in the short run.  
  Our study examines how Didi’s entries impact 
new car sales within a three-year period.  There are two 
reasons why expanding the investigative time window 
from one year to three years may yield new insights.  
First, the growing popularity of ride-hailing apps and 
the resultant publicity may influence consumer 
expectations well beyond the one-year time window. If 
consumers anticipate Didi Chuxing’s entry in the near 
future, they will have weaker incentives to purchase 
new cars.  Second, for those potential drivers who plan 
to register newly purchased cars for Didi or other 
platforms, they have a deferral option associated with 
their purchasing decisions.  This option is valuable 
because of the significant uncertainty regarding the 
timing of the platform entry, platform registration 
requirements and the intensity of car dealer special 
promotions immediately following the entry. Thus, the 
                                                   
1
 Didi Chuxing acquired Uber’s Chinese business in a deal worth 
US$35 billion in 2016 [78].  According to cnbc.com and Wall Street 
Journal, Didi Chuxing’s market valuation could reach US$80 billion 
in a potential IPO in the second half of 2018.   
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one-year time window cannot fully capture the 
potential impacts of this deferral option on new car 
sales.  This deferral option is even more valuable when 
it is unclear which platform will emerge as the 
dominant ride-hailing service provider.    
In our dataset, there are a few cities into which both 
Didi Chuxing and Uber China (the two major 
competing platforms at that time) entered.  Because 
platform competition in two-sided markets are usually 
very intense [64, 68], it is plausible that the major 
rival’s entry may considerably boost new car sales.  
Anecdotal evidence has shown that platform rivalries 
in two-sided markets often lead to below-cost pricing 
and prolonged platform subsidies [68].  Thus, we 
extend our empirical analysis to examine the overall 
impact of rival platform entries on new car sales within 
the three-year time window.  Consequently, we can 
better understand the role played by platform 
competition in influencing market dynamics of the 
sharing economy.      
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
We review the related literature in Section 2.  In 
Section 3, we describe the dataset and explain our 
research design. Section 4 summarizes and discusses 
the results of our statistical analyses. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Prior Literature  
 
Recent studies have highlighted the increasingly 
intense competition faced by incumbent firms in 
several industries directly connected to the sharing 
economy [10, 20,30,37].  It has been demonstrated that 
popular online two-sided platforms can substitute and 
complement goods/services offered by the incumbent 
firms [22,61].  As a prominent example of two-sided 
platforms that are quickly gaining popularity in the 
sharing economy, ride-hailing apps have recently 
attracted the attention of many researchers (e.g., 
[23,66,67,81]).  While the implications of the car-
sharing business for controlling pollution, improving 
traffic congestion, and reducing transportation costs 
have long been investigated [21, 29 44, 62], few 
studies have investigated the implications of ride-
hailing apps for new car demand.  
Because there are quite a few antecedents and 
consequences related to decision-makers’ participation 
in online two-sided platforms [4, 15, 34, 53, 78], the 
impacts of the emergence of two-sided platforms on 
the demand for the related goods/services are fairly 
complex [43, 46].  Guo et al. [36] contribute to this 
stream of research by empirically examining the 
impacts of Didi Chuxing’s entries on new car sales in 
dozens of cities across China.  Their analysis provides 
evidence of a positive impact of Didi’s entries on new 
car sales. They point out that Didi Chuxing’s dominant 
market position generates strong cross-side network 
effects that offer individuals strong incentives to buy 
new cars and register for Didi’s platform. This is 
consistent with the insights from previous studies 
suggesting that, once a large network reaches critical 
mass, it can rapidly generate significant new demand 
because of positive network feedback [50,51,55,59]. 
Nevertheless, previous IS studies have highlighted 
the role individuals’ expectations in influencing their 
decision-making (e.g., [8,51]). Because of the 
reputation of Didi Chuxing as the leading ride-hailing 
platform in China, its gradual entries into many 
Chinese cities can influence consumer expectations 
well beyond the one-year time window used in [36]. 
Moreover, as car-sharing has long been viewed by 
many people as a greener alternative to private car 
ownership, many potential car buyers’ expectations 
may be affected by mechanisms like herding or 
informational cascades ([26, 55]).  
A main insight from the real options literature is 
that the deferral option is very valuable when there is 
significant uncertainty about a new technology (e.g., 
[51, 57]).  Facing significant uncertainty surrounding 
the ride-hailing business model, many potential car 
buyers may retain their deferral options to let 
uncertainty be resolved over time, which also suggests 
that the investigative time window for Didi’s entries 
needs to be expanded.  In addition, extant literature on 
two-sided platforms has suggested that platform 
competition is usually very intense and prolonged 
platform subsidies are fairly common [64, 68].  Under 
these scenarios, competing platforms may make greater 
efforts to expand the network of their registered 
drivers.  As their efforts often incentivize potential car 
buyers to purchase new cars, intense platform 
competition may considerably boost new car sales in 
the short run. 
 
3. Research Design  
 
To investigate the competition effect of two leading 
ride-hailing apps (i.e., Didi Chuxing and Uber) on new 
car sales, we created a national monthly panel dataset 
from Jan 2013 to Dec 2015 for 50 prefecture-level 
cities. These cities include 32 cities where only Didi 
Chuxing entered during the observation period and 18 
cities where both Didi Chuxing and Uber entered. 
Thus, this dataset allows us to investigate both the 
effect of Didi Chuxing’s entry and the coexistence (or 
competition) effect of Didi Chuxing and Uber. Our 
analysis follows two steps. Firstly, we considered the 
above 50 cities as a treated group and we created an 
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untreated group (i.e., cities where no ride-hailing apps 
entered) using the propensity score matching (PSM) 
method. Secondly, a difference-in-difference analysis 
was performed on the two groups to infer the impacts 
of entries and the competition effect on new car sales.  
In this study, we identified another 50 prefecture-
level cities as the untreated (i.e., control) group. We 
performed the PSM method so that the untreated cities 
have similar probability (or propensity score) of 
becoming the treated cities but they did not. By 
ensuring the comparability of the treated group and 
untreated group, the PSM method helps reduce the 
endogeneity concern [41].  
To calculate the propensity score, we included the 
factors that reflect the demographic, social and 
economic status of a city because these factors might 
influence the entry decision of ride-hailing apps. 
Specifically, we included per capita income, GDP 
growth rate and population size because they reflect 
the level of urbanization of each city. We also included 
the number of mobile phone subscriptions, the 
geographic coverage of public transportation (i.e., the 
total number of registered public buses), and the 
intensity of paved roads, each of which can influence 
the use of ride-hailing apps. These variables are largely 
downloaded from the China City Statistical Yearbook, 
which is an annual official statistical report that 
summarizes key indicators of the economic and social 
development of China. All key variables are available 
both at the national level and at the local level 
(province, autonomous region, and municipality under 
the direct control of Central Government). Based on 
the propensity scores of the cities, we employ the 
nearest neighbor matching algorithm with replacement 
and caliper (0.05). The intuition behind matching is 
that the more similar the treated and untreated cities are 
in the above observed characteristics, the less likely 
they are to differ in unobserved ways. 
 
Table 1. Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  
Std. 
Dev
.  
Min  Max 
DiDi Entry  
0.099  0.29
9 
0.00
0  
1.000  
Uber Entry  
0.461 0.21
0 
0.00
0  
1.000  
Ln 
(Newcarsale)  
8.393 0.86
7  
6.01
6  
10.998 
Ln 
(Population)  
6.217 0.68
3 
3.40
0  
8.124 
ln(Employed)  
4.310 0.75
7 
2.28
7  
6.589  
Ln 
(Registered 
Unemployed)  
1.013 0.91
9 
 -
2.38
8  
4.095  
Ln (Average 
Wage)  
10.917  0.20
1 
10.2
57  
11.636  
Ln (GRP Per 
Capita)  
11.072  0.53
6 
9.21
9  
12.579  
Ln (Mobile 
Subscribers)  
6.416 0.68
3 
4.02
5  
8.313 
Ln (Internet 
Subscribers)  
4.663  0.74
2 
2.48
5  
7.094  
Ln (Highway 
Passenger 
Traffic)  
8.956 1.05
9 
4.64
4  
12.016 
Ln (Buses)  
7.444 1.02
9 
5.42
1 
10.072 
Ln (Bus 
Passenger 
Volume)  
9.997 1.24
1 
5.43
8 
13.090 
Ln (Taxis)  
8.059 1.11
6 
5.56
1  
11.131  
Ln (Road 
Area Per 
Capita)  
2.627 0.53
8 
1.01
2 
4.686 
Ln (Metro 
Length)  
0.830 1.78
3  
0.00
0  
6.443 
Note: The units of population, employed and registered 
unemployed population, mobile subscribers, internet 
subscribers, number of buses, bus passenger volume, 
highway passenger traffic are 10,000. 
 
The unit of the number of Taxi is one car. The units of 
average Wage and GRP Per Capita are RMB. 
 
4. Methodology and Results 
 
4.1 Difference-in-difference model 
     We first examine the impacts of Didi Chuxing’s 
entry on new car sales in cities where there was no 
competition from Uber.  Our analysis focuses on the 32 
cities where only Didi Chuxing entered during the 
observation period and those cities in the control 
group. We employ the following difference-in-
difference specification: 
 
  (   )                        ,      (1) 
 
where c represents cities and t refers to month 
(from January 2013 to December 2015); Yct is the 
number of new car registration plates for city c at time 
t; Ac represents a vector capturing city fixed effects; 
and Bt represents a vector capturing time fixed effects. 
Furthermore, Zct represents a vector reflecting city 
demographical features and socioeconomic indicators, 
such as population size, GDP growth rate, per capita 
income, the number of mobile phones possessed, per 
capita bus transportation, and per capita road 
kilometers. Descriptive statistics of these variables are 
listed in Table 1. Moreover, Rct is a binary variable 
that indicates the entry of the ride-hailing app. In this 
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case, Rct = 1 if Didi Chuxing was available in city c at 
time t, otherwise Rct = 0.      represents an error term. 
The coefficient p is the DID estimator which represents 
the impact of Didi Chuxing’s entry on new car sales. 
Table 2 reports the estimates. The results show that 
Didi Chuxing’s entry has a significant negative impact 
on new car sales (beta= -0.348).   
We extend our analysis to examine the impact of 
the competition between Uber and Didi Chuxing on 
new car sales. Our analysis includes all the 50 treated 
cities and the 50 untreated cities. We modified 
equation (1) as follows:  
 
    (   )                          
           ,                                                         (2)   
where DUct is a binary variable to indicate the entry of 
both Didi and Uber. In this case, DUct = 1 if Didi 
Chuxing and Uber are both available in city c at time t, 
otherwise DUct = 0. Table 3 reports the estimates. We 
can see a significant decrease (betas= -0.340 and -
0.200) in new car sale after the entry of either Didi 
Chuxing or Uber. Interestingly, the additional effect 
due to competition was positive (beta=0.084) when 
both Didi and Uber entered the same cities. Because 
the magnitude of this competition effect is smaller than 
that of the entry by a single ride-hailing app, the result 
implies that competition can alleviate the effect of 
sales reduction. One explanation is that, because of the 
fierce competition, the two ride-hailing service 
platforms might have significantly increased cash 
subsidies to motivate drivers to purchase new cars and 
register the new cars for their platforms. 
 
Table 2. Difference-in-difference model: the 
impact of Didi on new car sale 
Dependent Variable  Ln (NumCars)  
Didi Entry 
-0.348*** 
(0.026) 
ln(Population) 
-0.069 
(0.270) 
ln(Employed) 
0.328*** 
(0.078) 
Ln (Registered Unemployed) 
-0.027 
(0.022) 
Ln (Average Wage) 
0.833*** 
(0.110) 
Ln (GRP Per Capita) 
-0.124** 
(0.054) 
Ln (Mobile Subscribers) 
0.153** 
(0.075) 
Ln (Internet Subscribers) 
0.089* 
(0.053) 
Ln (Highway Passenger Traffic) 
-0.005 
(0.020) 
Ln (Buses) 
0.074* 
(0.019) 
Ln (Bus Passenger Volume) 
0.025 
(0.020) 
Ln (Taxis) 
-0.005 
(0.030) 
Ln (Road Area Per Capita) 
-0.104** 
(0.044) 
Ln (Metro Length) 
0.029 
(0.018) 
Observations  2952 
R-squared  0.890 
Month FE  Yes  
City FE  Yes  
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at city level 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 3. Difference-in-difference model: the 
competition effect of Didi and Uber 
Dependent Variable  Ln(NumCars)  
Didi Entry 
-0.340*** 
(0.025) 
Uber Entry 
-0.200*** 
(0.044) 
Didi Entry and Uber entry 
0.084* 
(0.051) 
ln(Population) 
-0.455 
(0.263) 
ln(Employed) 
0.310*** 
(0.074) 
Ln (Registered Unemployed) 
-0.026 
(0.021) 
Ln (Average Wage) 
0.857*** 
(0.107) 
Ln (GRP Per Capita) 
-0.041 
(0.042) 
Ln (Mobile Subscribers) 
0.160** 
(0.072) 
Ln (Internet Subscribers) 
-0.054 
(0.036) 
Ln (Highway Passenger 
Traffic) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
Ln (Buses) 
0.090*** 
(0.019) 
Ln (Bus Passenger Volume) 
0.048** 
(0.020) 
Ln (Taxis) 
-0.021 
(0.030) 
Ln (Road Area Per Capita) 
-0.084* 
(0.043) 
Ln (Metro Length) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
Observations  3600 
R-squared  0.890 
Month FE  Yes  
City FE  Yes  
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at city level 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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4.2 Relative time model 
 
Our previous analyses show the impacts on new 
cars sales after the ride-hailing apps entered the cities. 
However, because the news about a ride-hailing 
platform’s entry is usually announced to the public a 
few months in advance, consumers might have reacted 
before the actual entry month. Therefore, we examine 
the lead-lag effect of ride-hailing apps on new car sales 
using a relative time model as suggested by [9].  
Relative time models have been widely used in the 
extant literature (e.g., [19, 39]). We add time dummy 
variables (   
 
) for up to five months before Didi’s 
entry, and four months after Didi’s entry, where j 
belongs to {-5, -4…,3, 4 and forward}, indicating 
whether month t is the jth month since Didi Chuxing 
becomes available in a city. Further, we multiply the 
entry dummies with a weight (w) which measures the 
unemployed population/10,000 in a city. The idea is 
that the entry of ride-hailing apps may create different 
“competition intensity” across the cities. As the entry 
creates new job opportunities, it may produce stronger 
impacts in cities with significant unemployed 
population. The relative time model is shown as below:                      
 
  (   )              ∑         
           (3) 
 
Table 4 reports the coefficient estimations. The 
results show that, as we expected, Didi’s entries can 
negatively impact new car sales for a few months prior 
to the official Didi entry month. More specifically, we 
can see a significantly negative impact on new car 
sales for up to five months prior to Didi’s entry. 
Similarly, we can examine the lead-lag effects 
under the scenario where Didi and Uber entered the 
same city. A modified version of Equation (3) is used 
for the relative time analysis: 
 
  (   )                          
∑          
        ,                                               (4) 
 
where j belongs to {-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3}, representing 
whether month t is the jth month since Didi Chuxing 
and Uber both become available in a city. We 
estimated fewer lead months here because usually the 
rival platform followed the incumbent platform very 
soon (usually in three months). The results are reported 
in Table 5. There was a significant increase (1.3 %) in 
the number of car registrations immediately after Didi 
and Uber both entered the same city. The effect lasts 
for a relatively short period (i.e., two months) and then 
gradually diminishes.  
 
Table 4. Relative time model: Didi entry only 
 
Dependent Variable  Ln(NumCars)  
Didi Entry_prior5_w 
-0.087*** 
(0.0112) 
Didi Entry_prior4_w 
-0.093*** 
(0.012) 
  
Didi Entry_prior3_w 
-0.076*** 
(0.112) 
Didi Entry_prior2_w 
-0.072*** 
(0.112) 
Didi Entry_prior1_w 
-0.076*** 
(0.012) 
Didi Entry_month_w 
-0.069*** 
(0.012) 
Didi Entry_after1_w 
-0.063*** 
(0.012) 
Didi Entry_after2_w 
-0.070*** 
(0.012) 
Didi Entry_after3_w 
-0.078*** 
(0.012) 
Didi Entry_after4forward_w 
-0.088*** 
(0.012) 
ln(Population) 
-0.357 
(0.257) 
ln(Employed) 
0.202*** 
(0.075) 
Ln (Registered Unemployed) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
Ln (Average Wage) 
0.613*** 
(0.106) 
Ln (GRP Per Capita) 
-0.111** 
(0.052) 
Ln (Mobile Subscribers) 
0.491*** 
(0.075) 
Ln (Internet Subscribers) 
0.092* 
(0.050) 
Ln (Highway Passenger 
Traffic) 
-0.0002** 
(0.019) 
Ln (Buses) 
0.056*** 
(0.019) 
Ln (Bus Passenger Volume) 
0.010** 
(0.019) 
Ln (Taxis) 
-0.018 
(0.028) 
Ln (Road Area Per Capita) 
-0.112*** 
(0.042) 
Ln (Metro Length) 
0.025* 
(0.018) 
Observations  2952 
R-squared  0.900 
Month FE  Yes  
City FE  Yes  
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at city 
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Relative time model: Didi and Uber 
both entry 
 
Dependent Variable  Ln(NumCars)  
Didi Entry 
-0.341*** 
(0.024) 
Uber Entry 
-0.172*** 
(0.036) 
Both Entry_prior2_w 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
Both Entry_prior1_w 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Both Entry_month_w 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
Both Entry_after1_w 
0.009* 
(0.006) 
Both Entry_after2_w 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Both Entry_after3_w 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Both 
Entry_after4forward_w 
0.0004 
(0.003) 
ln(Population) 
-0.434* 
(0.263) 
ln(Employed) 
0.301*** 
(0.074) 
Ln (Registered 
Unemployed) 
-0.027 
(0.021) 
Ln (Average Wage) 
0.848*** 
(0.108) 
Ln (GRP Per Capita) 
-0.042 
(0.043) 
Ln (Mobile 
Subscribers) 
0.161** 
(0.072) 
Ln (Internet 
Subscribers) 
-0.054 
(0.036) 
Ln (Highway 
Passenger Traffic) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
Ln (Buses) 
0.089*** 
(0.019) 
Ln (Bus Passenger 
Volume) 
0.047** 
(0.020) 
Ln (Taxis) 
-0.020 
(0.030) 
Ln (Road Area Per 
Capita) 
-0.081* 
(0.043) 
Ln (Metro Length) 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
Observations  3600 
R-squared  0.900 
Month FE  Yes  
City FE  Yes  
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at city 
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. We don’t report the estimation of control 
variables because of the page limit 
 
5. Discussions and Conclusion  
 
 The gradual entries of ride-hailing platforms across 
China provide us with a unique opportunity to examine 
the interplay among network effects, consumer 
expectations and platform competition in the sharing 
economy.  Our study provides empirical evidence 
showing that the initial entry of Didi Chuxing (the 
leading ride-hailing platform in China) negatively 
impacts new car sales.  This negative impact occurs as 
early as five months prior to the official entry month. 
We point out that this early impact is likely caused by 
consumer expectations and those people who retain 
their valuable real options by deferring their car 
purchasing decisions. More interestingly, our analysis 
suggests that intensified competition resulting from the 
entries of two major competing platforms can alleviate 
the negative impact on new car sales in the short run. 
In other words, while car sharing may reduce the 
purchase of new cars and promote more sustainable 
travel behavior, platform rivalries in the market can 
boost new car demand and consequently alleviate the 
new car sales decline driven by platform entries.  
Our study contributes to the growing literature that 
focuses on the interactions between traditional 
industries and digital start-ups in the sharing economy 
(e.g., [20,36,37]).  It is worth noting that strong 
network externalities have both positive impacts and 
negative impacts on new car sales.  They positively 
impact new car sales by offering new drivers strong 
incentives to join major ride-hailing platforms, and 
they negatively impact new car sales by making it 
increasingly convenient for people to use ride-hailing 
apps, thereby making private car ownerships less 
appealing.  Therefore, to fully assess the impacts of 
platform entries on new car sales, we also need to pay 
attention to consumer expectations and platform 
competition.  Our results suggest that, on the one hand, 
consumers’ expectations about future platform entries 
and their real option thinking can negatively influence 
new car sales several months before the official entry 
month.  On the other hand, because of the fierce 
competition driven by cross-side network effects, 
platform competition can significantly boost new car 
sales to alleviate the negative impact, at least in the 
short run. These observations are consistent with the 
insights from previous studies demonstrating 
expectations, learning, competition and uncertainty 
play important roles in markets subject to strong 
network externalities (e.g., [26,50,51,55,56,59]).                 
Our study also contributes to the extant literature on 
two-sided platform competition (e.g., [64,68]).  Our 
empirical results suggest that competing platforms 
have made efforts to quickly expand the networks of 
their registered drivers by incentivizing new car 
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purchases in the short run.  While the impacts of these 
platform rivalries on new car sales may be transitory, 
the social welfare implications of platform competition 
are less clear, and they consequently merit future 
investigations.  Furthermore, the increasingly fierce 
rivalry between Didi Chuxing and Meituan (the 
dominant Chinese group-buying platform) highlights 
the importance of understanding extrinsic network 
effects in platform competition.  Extrinsic network 
effects are indirect network externalities created by 
complementary products or services [12,33,59].  By 
leveraging its massive group buying network, Meituan 
has quickly emerged as a major threat to Didi 
Chuxing’s dominance in the ride-hailing business.  We 
believe that future empirical studies may shed fresh 
light on the role played by indirect network 
externalities in influencing competitive dynamics of 
the sharing economy.   
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